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Ebolavirus outbreaks and epidemics have affected regions of Africa since its discovery in 
1976. Presently, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is experiencing its tenth and largest 
outbreak of Ebolavirus, infecting nearly 3,432 individuals and causing 2,253 deaths. First declared 
an official outbreak on August 1, 2018, the DRC Ministry of Health (MOH) and other global health 
institutions are having difficulties in controlling the spread of infection due to community 
resistance and mistrust, poor healthcare infrastructures, political conflict, civil unrest, and porous 
geographic boundaries. A literature review and analysis were performed to evaluate contributing 
factors to the ongoing outbreak in the DRC. In this essay, I outline the contributing factors that 
have led to the continuity of the ebolavirus epidemic in the DRC and predict long-term effects it 
may have on the country. By analyzing up-to-date World Health Organization (WHO) situation 
reports, journal articles, and newspaper reports, I have found that in order to sufficiently control 
the outbreak, continued surveillance and contact tracing is required in combination with building 
community trust and transparency. It is important to understand outbreak and infection control 
measures in historically underdeveloped areas, especially those with poor healthcare infrastructure 
and politically unstable environments. By gaining insight on the successes and shortcomings of 
specific public health control measures, health ministries and global health organizations can 
improve upon their actions and distribution of resources in times of dangerous outbreaks. 
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The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is currently facing its largest ebolavirus 
outbreak ever to be recorded, infecting nearly 3,444 individuals and killing 2,264. Presently, the 
DRC’s Ministry of Health (MOH), along with partnering agencies, such as the World Health 
Organization (WHO), the United Nations (UN), and other international health agencies have 
focused their response efforts on surveillance, contact tracing, vaccination and community 
mobilization to stop the spread of disease. Although response efforts have prevented cases from 
spreading to other parts of Africa, health authorities are still having difficulty controlling the 
spread of disease because of the country’s poor healthcare infrastructure, community resistance 
and distrust, presence of armed conflict groups, and high mobility of the population. This essay 
describes the characteristics of the main contributing factors that have led to difficulties in 
controlling the outbreak and suggests how response methods should be improved to stop the 
spread of disease. 
1.1 History of Ebola 
Ebolavirus outbreaks and epidemics have affected regions of Africa since 1976 when it 
was discovered during two simultaneous outbreaks in Nzara, South Sudan and Yambuku, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, the latter of which occurred near the Ebola River, where the 
virus received its namesake (World Health Organization, 2018). Ebolavirus is one of three 
members of the Filovirdae family and comprises of five distinct species, Budibugyo ebolavirus, 
2 
 
Zaire ebolavirus, Sudan ebolavirus, Reston ebolavirus, and Taï ebolavirus (Bah et al., 2015). 
Zaire ebolavirus has historically resulted in the highest case fatality rate (CFR) of up to 90%, 
while Zaire, Sudan, and Budibugyo Ebolavirus have been associated with the largest outbreaks 
in Africa (World Health Organization, 2018). Recent outbreaks of ebolavirus in West Africa 
during 2014-2016 and presently in the Democratic Republic of Congo have been a result of 
Zaire ebolavirus (2018 Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo: Ebola, 2019). 
Ebolavirus is a type of filovirus, first discovered in 1967 as a causative agent of a 
hemorrhagic fever outbreak among lab workers in Europe. Filoviruses are filamentous viruses 
that contain negative-sense single-stranded RNA and possess single glycoprotein spikes on the 
virion surface (Feldmann & Klenk, 1996). The structure of ebolavirus includes a nucleocapsid, 
matrix space, and envelope, while the genome consists of seven genes encoding for eight 
proteins (Falasca et al., 2015). Of these genes, the most notable is the GP gene which encodes 
for two separate glycoproteins, GP and sGP. The GP glycoprotein is responsible for forming 
spikes on the envelope of the virion, which is required for viral cellular entry, while the sGP 
glycoprotein is secreted from the host cell and helps with modulation of host immunity (Falasca 
et al., 2015). The ebolavirus glycoproteins are important for virus function, but also serve as 
important targets for therapeutic medicines and vaccine development 
Ebolavirus is thought to be zoonotic, with the natural host of the virus being fruit bats of 
the Pterpodid family; however, this has not been officially confirmed. Non-human primates have 
also been a source of human infection; however, because the primates develop severe and fatal 
illness when infected, it was confirmed not to be a natural reservoir (United Kingdom 
Government, 2018). Ebolavirus is introduced to humans through close contact of blood, 
secretions, organs or other bodily fluids of infected animals. The virus spreads via human-to-
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human transmission through direct contact, whether it be through broken skin or mucous 
membranes. It can also be spread through coming into contact with surfaces and material 
contaminated with infected fluids (Feldmann & Klenk, 1996). Symptomology of the disease 
begins with sudden onset of fever or fatigue, along with muscle pain, headache, and sore throat. 
It is then followed by vomiting, diarrhea, internal and external bleeding, impaired kidney and 
liver function, and low platelet and low white blood cell counts. It causes severe fluid 
distribution problems due to changes in vascular permeability. The mortality rate for ebolavirus 
is approximately 30-90% with no proven treatment therapy available. Patients infected with the 
virus are given medication and therapies to assist with symptom and pain management (Vine et 
al., 2017). In 2015, an experimental vaccine was developed and proven highly protective against 
the virus in a major trail in Guinea; however, there is still no commercially licensed and available 
vaccine for ebolavirus (Sridhar, 2015). 
1.2 Timeline of Outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
The DRC has an involved history with ebolavirus outbreaks. Over the past forty years, 
the country has been home to nine previous outbreaks all of which have been located in rural, 
secluded areas of the country. The current ebolavirus outbreak in the DRC is the largest to date, 
and is the second largest ebolavirus epidemic ever recorded, behind the West African epidemic 
in 2014. It has largely affected urban populations that border the countries of Uganda and South 
Sudan (Sikakulya et al., 2020). 
The epidemic began in late July of 2018, when North Kivu Provincial Health 
Authorities reported clusters of cases of hemorrhagic fever in the village of Mangina in the 
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Malabako rural health zone. These cases were epidemiologically different from cases during 
an outbreak in the Equateur province earlier in May 2018 (Timeline of the Ebola outbreak 
response in Democratic Republic of the Congo 2018, 2020). Representatives from the MOH 
and WHO began an investigation of multiple suspected cases and found that these individuals 
tested positive for hemorrhagic fever. On August 1st, the MOH made an official declaration of 
an outbreak of ebolavirus disease in the North Kivu province, and by August 7th  the DRC’s 
National Institute of Biomedical Research (INRB), confirmed that the outbreak was Zaire 
ebolavirus, the same strain that had affected West Africa in 2014 (Timeline of the Ebola 
outbreak response in Democratic Republic of the Congo 2018, 2020). 
Over the course of the next few months the epicenter of the outbreak progressively 
moved south towards the larger cities of Beni, Butembo, and Katwa (Médecins Sans 
Frontières (MSF) International, 2019). By November 2018, the outbreak had become the 
second largest recorded ebolavirus outbreak in history. Control efforts, such as vaccination, 
contact tracing, Ebola Treatment Centers (ETCs), community education, and Point of Entry 
(POE) screenings, were put in place by the MOH and WHO in order to limit the spread of 





Figure 1. Map of Ituri and Kivu provinces where ongoing MSF projects are located 
(Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) International, 2019). 
 
With nearly 1,000 people dying from the disease by May 2019, WHO had yet to declare 
the epidemic a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) (Médecins Sans 
Frontières (MSF) International, 2019). On June 11, 2019 the Ugandan MOH confirmed their 
first case of ebolavirus from the DRC, making this the first cross-border case in the timeline of 
the outbreak. This event, along with cases being reported in the highly populated capital city of 
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Goma, prompted WHO to officially declare the outbreak a PHEIC on July 17th, 2019 (Alexandra 
M. Medley et al., 2020). The declaration of a PHEIC authorizes the distribution of additional 
funding and resources to countries highly affected by the disease. Throughout the entirety of 
2019, hotspots of cases would die down only to flare up again weeks or months later, with little 
indication of the chain of transmission, further signifying that surveillance and contact tracing 
had become a significant challenge for health workers (Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) 
International, 2019). Attacks on ETCs in the beginning of 2019, along with resurgence of 
community violence towards the end of 2019, have also contributed to challenges in controlling 
the epidemic. 
1.3 Present Updates on the Outbreak 
To date, the outbreak has affected 29 Health Zones in the provinces of South Kivu, North 
Kivu, and Ituri, with a majority of the cases located in North-Kivu. A total of 3,444 people have 
been infected by the virus, leading to 2,264 total deaths since the start of the outbreak. The 
overall CFR is reported to be 66%, with 56% (1,916) of cases being female, and 28% (963) of 
cases being children under the age of 18. Only 5% (172) of cases have been healthcare workers. 
It is important to note that these numbers do not reflect the likely high number of unreported 





Figure 2. An epidemiological curve of cases in DRC, starting in April of 2018 and ending in January of 2020 
(Ebola virus disease – Democratic Republic of the Congo, 2020). 
 
 
The MOH, along with other national authorities in the DRC, WHO, and contributing 
partners, have collaborated in implementing various outbreak control measures to reduce and 
stop the outbreak. Over 249,000 contacts have been registered to date, and presently 1900 are 
under surveillance. Since August 8, 2018, 276,520 people have been vaccinated with the rVSV- 
ZEBOV-GP ebolavirus vaccine, while vaccination with the Ad26.ZEBOV/MVA-BN-Filo 
vaccine continues in two health areas near Goma, with 7,611 people vaccinated since its 
introduction on November 14, 2019. The DRC currently has 11 operational ETCs and 25 
ebolavirus transit centers located in North Kivu, South Kivu, and Ituri. POE screenings are still 
in effect, with a total of 155 million screenings having occurred since the beginning of the 
outbreak. The outbreak has received funding from WHO, partnering organizations, and foreign 
governments to assist with response efforts. As of August 1, 2019, approximately $148 million 
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has been received to combat the outbreak (Ebola response funding: Democratic Republic of the 
Congo 2018-2020, 2020). 
Presently, the outbreak has been controlled to a relatively small geographic area, with 
only five new confirmed cases being reported from two health areas as of February 23, 2020. 
Health officials are cautiously optimistic as the overall trend in geographic spread of disease has 
declined; however, “the risk of resurgence within the DRC and neighboring countries remains 
high, and continued containment of the outbreak is contingent on maintaining access and 
security in affected communities” (Ebola Virus Disease: Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
2020). WHO has requested further funding in order to maintain current levels of operations to 
prevent a re-emergence of the outbreak. A total of $40 million USD is currently needed “to 
ensure continuity of response and preparedness activities to bring the case incidence to zero, and 
[to] continue building strong, resilient health systems” (Ebola Virus Disease: Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, 2020). 
1.4 Intervention and Response Efforts 
WHO and the DRC MOH have implemented response plans that have included the 
following interventions: screening of suspect cases at POE, contact tracing and surveillance, 
laboratory testing, case management and infection prevention and control, safe and dignified 
burials (SDB), vaccination, therapeutics, community mobilization, and free access to 
healthcare (Sikakulya et al., 2020). Since the start of the outbreak, over 155 million screenings 
have been performed at approximately 115 POE, along with over 249,000 contacts being 
registered in a national database (Ebola Virus Disease: Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
9 
 
2020). Nine ETCs and fourteen ebolavirus transit centers are presently active in the provinces 
of North Kivu, South Kivu, and Ituri. Health officials have continued efforts in SDB through 
the Red Cross SDB database, and educational discussions, mass awareness-awareness raising, 
and community dialogues are ongoing. “Support [has been] provided to teams in all response 
intervention areas and activities are jointly planned to ensure respect and engagement of all 
affected families and communities” (Ebola Virus Disease: Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
2020). Partnerships between the DRC MOH, WHO and other international health 
organizations, continue to support public health operations and regional preparedness activities 
that have been outlined in strategic response plans. 
One of the most important methods of prevention and control that have been deployed 
to stop the ebolavirus outbreak in the DRC has been the use of vaccinations and ring 
vaccination techniques. Ring vaccination consists of identifying contacts and contacts of 
contacts and vaccinating them to control disease spread (Wells et al., 2019). Contrasting to the 
West African ebolavirus outbreak in 2014, the DRC is presently using two different vaccines, 
both in clinical study phases. The Merck rVSV-ZEBOV vaccine was previously deployed in a 
phase III trial in Guinea during the 2014 West African outbreak. The vaccine was found to be 
highly protective in single doses, and final analyses of the trial revealed that it had high 
protective efficacy and effectiveness to prevent ebolavirus disease (Henao-Restrepo et al., 
2017). 
In mid-November of 2019, a second Ebola vaccine was deployed, in addition to the 
rVSV-ZEBOV vaccine, to consenting individuals in the North Kivu and Ituri provinces. The 
Ad26.ZEBOV/MVA-BN-Filo vaccine, produced by Johnson & Johnson, is a multivalent 
vaccine designed to provide protection against ebolavirus, but also to Marburg viruses, Sudan 
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viruses, and Tai Forest viruses (Ad26.ZEBOV/MVA-BN-Filo Ebola Vaccine, 2020). As of 
February 23, 2020, approximately 16,140 people have been vaccinated with the 
Ad26.ZEBOV/MVA-BN-Filo vaccine (Ebola Virus Disease: Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, 2020). 
The use of vaccines has been tremendously useful in controlling the epidemic; however, 
it does pose challenges when being deployed to communities. The DRC is home to numerous 
politically volatile areas plagued with violence. This puts healthcare workers at risk and 
prevents more rural communities from receiving necessary vaccinations. The rVSV-ZEBOV 
vaccine requires transportation in temperatures of around -60°C to areas that are remote and 
often lack adequate roads and infrastructure. The Ad26.ZEBOV/MVA-BN-Filo vaccine needs 
to be given in 2 doses, 56 days apart, thus requiring follow-up appointments. Multi-dose 
vaccines are notoriously difficult because compliance for secondary boosters is significantly 
lower than the initial dose. Populations in this area are also very mobile due to unemployment 
and violence; therefore, follow up appointment 56 days later may prove to be difficult 
(Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) International, 2019). Identifying contacts of contacts for ring 
vaccination is also challenging because of population mobility and displacement.  
Along with vaccination, throughout the outbreak, WHO has fast-tracked the use of 
antibody-based therapies for ebolavirus, mAv114, ZMapp, REGN-EB3, along with the 
antiviral-agent, Remdesvir (Alexandra M. Medley et al., 2020). In a study conducted in 
November 2018, 681 confirmed ebolavirus patients from the provinces of Ituri and North 
Kivu were enrolled in a randomized controlled trial to test the efficacy of the four different 
therapeutics (Mulangu et al., 2019). An initial analysis during the trial revealed that REGN-
EB3 and Mab114 showed superior efficacy in preventing death, and efficacy in these drugs 
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were highest for patients who were diagnosed after early onset of symptoms (Levine, 2019). 
The treatments continue to be offered to patients in the DRC under compassionate use 
(“Investigational monoclonal antibody to treat Ebola is safe in adults,” 2019). 
12 
 
2.0 Contributing Factors to the Ebolavirus Epidemic 
2.1 Disease Burden and Poor Healthcare Infrastructure 
The DRC has been home to one of the world’s longest running humanitarian crises. In 
January 2020, it was ranked as the second top-most humanitarian crisis to be watched by the 
International Rescue Committee (The top 10 crises the world should be watching in 2020, 
2020). At just over 5 million people, the DRC has the largest internally displaced population 
in Africa. Nearly 15.9 million people require humanitarian assistance and 15.6 million suffer 
from crisis levels of food insecurity.   In 2017, the life expectancy at birth was only 60 years old, 
and most recent reports define the national poverty rate to be 63.9% (Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, 2019). 
Historically, the DRC had a well-organized and functioning primary healthcare and 
referral system; however, in the last 30 years, the system has dramatically deteriorated due to 
political instability, social unrest, and armed conflict (Ntembwa & Van Lerberghe, 2015).   The 
health status of the population is alarming, with the four principal causes of death being 
malaria, lower respiratory infection, neonatal disorders, and tuberculosis, a ranking that has not 
changed since 2007 (Democratic Republic of the Congo, 2017). Non-communicable diseases 
associated   with epidemiological transitions account for 21% of the national burden of disease 
(Ntembwa & Van Lerberghe, 2015). In 2018, $19 USD were spent per person on healthcare in 
the DRC, which ranks below WHO’s recommended $60 per person in order to deliver essential 




The structure of the health system in the DRC is organized into three levels. The first 
level, implementation, involves 516 health districts, each managed by a district team that 
oversees a network of health centers and a district hospital. Each district typically covers a 
population of 100,000 to 200,000 individuals. The second level, intermediate, is responsible 
for technical and logistical support and is managed by provincial health departments, which 
have increased from 11 to 26 in recent years. The final level, central, generally plays a 
normative role (Ntembwa & Van Lerberghe, 2015).   
The health system is further organized by the complexity of the care facilities. Patient 
care starts with local health centers where providers range from non-licensed individuals with 
no training to nurses who have graduated from government-certified programs. The next level 
are primary care clinics, which are staffed by licensed nurses and are linked to secondary 
health centers. Secondary health centers are hospitals and clinics that house licensed medical 
doctors, and can provide definitive treatment, along with powers to refer patients to regional or 
provincial hospitals. Regional and provincial hospitals can then report and refer patients to the 
national hospital in Kinshasa (Jowett et al., 2016). 
The process of revitalizing the health sector in the DRC began in 2005 with the 
adoption of the Health Systems Strengthening Strategy (HSSS), a joint project involving the 
DRC’s MOH and WHO’s Department for Health Systems Governance in Financing. The 
goals of this project were to provide “a framework for reforms to overcome inefficiencies in 
the DRC and the marginalization of national policy-making in a context of dependency on 
external aid” (Ntembwa & Van Lerberghe, 2015). 
The DRC’s healthcare system, leading up to revitalization processes, was 
characterized by inefficient use of international and domestic resources. Specific downfalls 
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of the system included: disproportionate management costs, waste and duplication because 
of fragmented services and programs, organizational and managerial inefficiencies, 
unproductive deployment of workforce, along with duplication of supply chains for 
medicines and health products (Ntembwa & Van Lerberghe, 2015).   
Duplication and multiplicity of projects and programs within the DRC’s healthcare 
system has led to ineffective and mismanaged deployment of resources necessary for regular 
health services. For example, health districts in the DRC are intended to be led by district 
management teams of five individuals. These positions are responsible for the development 
and operation of all district health services, along with supervising projects and providing 
follow-up and support to their respective health facilities. As externally funded disease 
programs started to increase within the districts, more individuals were brought on to the 
district management teams. Eventually, some districts had up to 18 individuals managing 
overlapping projects but receiving separate resources from separate funders, thus leading to 
excess amounts of resources that could be shared amongst multiple programs. An example of 
this could be that a health district team may have received a set of motorcycles to supervise 
immunizations activities, another set for an HIV program, and others for TB or malaria 
surveillance (Ntembwa & Van Lerberghe, 2015). 
When the ebolavirus epidemic began in July, though healthcare centers were 
widespread, many were basic, and as one doctor described “often just one room and some of 
them [were used] for traditional medicine”. ETCs and ebolavirus transit centers were built in 
key locations to provide care, where proper PPE could be used by healthcare workers, and 




It is important to note that access to health facilities and ETCs poses a barrier to 
suspected and probable ebolavirus patients. Road infrastructure and transportation to necessary 
facilities can be challenging to individuals with limited resources (Emmanuel, 2016). Other 
barriers that exist for patients include geographically violent areas, geographic proximity to 
health facilities, and obligations as the main household caregiver.   
2.2 Internal Conflict and Armed Militant Groups 
Conflict and civil unrest have engulfed the DRC for decades. In the wake of the 
ebolavirus epidemic, in the provinces of Ituri and North Kivu, violent attacks and armed 
groups have made it nearly impossible to maintain control measures to stop the spread of 
disease. Dozens of armed groups reside in the region as remnants of regional wars sparked 
by the Rwandan genocide. These groups compete for control of illegal taxation, territory, 
and trade of resources, such as gold, timber, charcoal, fuel and illegal drugs (Ilunga 
Kalenga et al., 2019). Changes in lead government officials and postponements of national 
elections have further contributed to the hostile sociopolitical atmosphere in the DRC (The 
World Bank in DRC: Overview, 2019). 
North Kivu has been characterized as the epicenter of displacement and casualties 
caused by internal violence (Ilunga Kalenga et al., 2019). Of the 8.3 million individuals 
residing in North Kivu, 2.5 million of the people are identified as displaced or refugees 
(Ilunga Kalenga et al., 2019). Conflict between Congolese security forces and armed militant 
groups have resulted in eruptions of violence targeting civilians. The violent atmosphere has 
displaced tens of thousands of residents into neighboring provinces and countries, such as 
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Rwanda and Uganda, thus making control efforts for disease spread more difficult (Ebola 
Virus Disease Outbreak—Democratic Republic of the Congo, August 2018-November 2019, 
2019). The region hosts a disproportionate share of violent events and in 2018, 51% of the 
DRC’s total violent events and protests took place in North Kivu. The region also experienced 
an uptick in violent events from January 2017 to October 2018, in which a total of 800 violent 
events and protests occurred, resulting in 1,596 fatalities (Matfess, 2018). 
Surges and increases in battles, along with civilian targeting, has been a result of 
continuous conflict between the Congolese government and armed military groups, including 
the Armed Democratic Forces (ADF). The ADF was created in 1995 and was originally 
founded in opposition to Ugandan government leadership. The group presently resides in the 
mountainous region of the DRC-Ugandan border area, a hotspot region for ebolavirus cases 
(Matfess, 2018). In 2013, it was estimated that the ADF had a strength of approximately 1,200 
to 1,500 armed fighters located in north-east Beni in the North Kivu province (Allied 
Democratic Forces (ADF), 2016). Violent events involving the ADF in North Kivu surged 
more than 140% from 2017 to 2018, with greater amounts of attacks targeting civilian 
populations (Matfess, 2018). 
Violence has increasingly targeted ETCs, healthcare facilities, and Ebola response 
teams in the North Kivu region. For example, one of the first attacks on an ETC occurred in 
the city of Butembo on February 27, 2019. The facility was being run by Swiss MSF workers 
and in the early evening, assailants attempted to force entry with two cars and armed fire. 
Once inside, the attackers did not enter “red zone” areas, where confirmed cases resided, but 
went straight to the power supply and shot at it. They repeatedly demanded for a specific ICU 
specialist, and eventually, loss of power led to two patients dying from lack of oxygen (Wells 
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et al., 2019). Other attacks on ETC’s have focused on destroying resources and facilities, 
kidnapping or killing essential healthcare personnel, and overall disruption of care for the 
critically infected. Between January and November 2019, 43 arson attacks on health facilities 
in the DRC were reported, occurring in areas where armed groups operate, and community 
levels of distrust were high. Motives of these attacks remain unclear to authorities, along with 
the specific identities of perpetrator groups (Attacks on health care in the context of the Ebola 
emergency response in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 2019). 
When treatment centers are targeted, Ebola response efforts, such as contact tracing, 
investigation of suspected cases, and ring vaccination are stalled, thus resulting in increases 
in new Ebola cases. Attacks on public spaces and resources also prevent response teams 
from contact tracing and case investigations (McClean, 2017). It is important to note that 
contact tracing is essential for the control of infection because it allows proper deployment 
of ring vaccination techniques. For example, in May 2018, the DRC experienced an 
ebolavirus outbreak; however, it was controlled in two and a half months because of 
continuous contact tracing and correct distribution of the rVSV-ZEBOV vaccine (Wells et 
al., 2019). 
Insecurity and violence in this region have put healthcare workers at risk. The 
DRC’s MOH and other international organizations, such as Medicins Sans Frontiers (MSF), 
have been forced to leave certain areas of the DRC at different points during the outbreak 
because the safety of frontline healthcare workers took precedent over response efforts. 
Other efforts were stalled because of violent episodes, characterized by kidnappings and 
killings, prohibited healthcare professionals from operating around the major road 
connecting the North Kivu and Ituri provinces (Wells et al., 2019). These gaps in 
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surveillance, vaccination, and contact tracing lead to upticks in cases and prevents the 
outbreak from being controlled (Krenn, 2019). 
2.3 Community Mistrust 
Lack of confidence in ebolavirus responses are driven by perceptions of inadequate 
patient care, callous adherence to protocol, disrespectful handling of corpses (Masumbuko 
Claude et al., 2019), financial motivations of large health institutions, and ingrained distrust 
of state and militant organizations (Ilunga Kalenga et al., 2019). Misinformation and lack of 
understanding of the disease amplifies mistrust within communities, and further discourages 
people from seeking treatment at an ETC or receiving a vaccination (Krenn, 2019). 
Community reluctance towards ebolavirus prevention strategies were initially interpreted as 
a misunderstanding of public health practices. Further investigations revealed that these 
practices had interfered with important cultural and social values of the communities, such 
as requiring total separation from loved ones, denial of human touch at the point of death, 
and the substitution of safe burials for traditional burial rites (Ilunga Kalenga et al., 2019). A 
secondary source of animosity towards foreign response teams revolves around the idea of 
“disaster capitalism”. Some communities believed that foreign response teams were 
motivated by profit from the continued response efforts, as evidenced by delays in 
responding to potentially infected patients and corpses and perceived sluggish roll out of 
interventions (Masumbuko Claude et al., 2019). 
Longitudinal data reported by the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative found that the 
North Kivu region had declining perceptions of security and trust in the government, 
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security, and humanitarian workers, which further complicates response measures employed 
by local and foreign health authorities (Vinck et al., 2019). The study also found that a lack 
of understanding of the disease and a lack trust in institutions trying and failing to deploy 
control strategies in the past have discouraged individuals to seek out medical attention from 
Ebola treatment facilities (Krenn, 2019). Community mistrust is further exacerbated by 
historical attacks from Congolese security forces. In the past, certain members of the 
Congolese army have been implicated in human rights abuses, such as killings, summary 
executions, rapes, pillage, and trafficking of minerals. Officials say they often cannot 
distinguish between the Congolese army and MOH officials, who are there to treat Ebola. 
“‘The [Congolese] Government is criticized for not doing enough to make it safe. The UN is 
judged to be complicit in the massacres here, and for not protecting the population except for 
a few battalions. And NGOs, people think they are here just to make money’, says N’djoloko 
Tambwe, an MOH representative, summarizing research from anthropologists on his team,” 
(Moran, 2018). 
Social mobilization and risk communication were essential features of the response to 
the 2014 West African Ebola epidemic. In Sierra Leone, when case reports were at its peak, 
individuals’ attitudes towards healthcare worker interactions, accountability in health resource 
management, and visitations to Ebola Treatment Units were at an all-time low (Nuriddin et al., 
2018). As transmission began to wane, along with Ebola survivors leaving ETCs and 
reentering their communities, community trust in prevention and treatment efforts increased. 
In a study focusing on social resistance in communities, 77% of respondents agreed or 
strongly agreed that the epidemic would persist if local communities continue to not be 
engaged (Masumbuko Claude et al., 2019). One of the main focuses of the World Health 
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Organization’s tactics in controlling the epidemic is employing risk communication, social 
mobilization, and community engagement. As of late January 2020, WHO continues to host 
educational discussions, mass awareness-raising, and community dialogues to increase health 
literacy and community trust. Topics of discussion include the importance of vaccination 
against ebolavirus disease, the importance of consulting health facilities and ETCs, along with 
prevention measures against ebolavirus (Ebola Virus Disease: Democratic Republic of the 
Congo External Situation Report, 2020). 
Early reports based off these community engagement strategies have found to be 
successful. It is unclear as to what specific elements of the strategy drove reduction in cases; 
however, several indicators suggest a combination of different factors may have played a role. 
For instance, improved community dialogue permitted better access to health zones, reducing 
the number of health zones that were inaccessible due to hostile groups and reducing the 
number of health zones with community resistance. Improved acceptance likely allowed 
improvements in all aspects of intervention and surveillance (Jombart et al., 2020). 
2.4 Unique Geographic Boundaries 
The geographic boundaries of the current epidemic pose unique challenges for ongoing 
response efforts. In the past, outbreaks have occurred in remote and hard to reach areas. The 
current outbreak is one of the first to reach urban environments. North Kivu is a densely 
populated area, which shares a border with Uganda. Large portions of the population travel for 
trade and business between neighboring countries in the east, posing the risk of cases entering 
areas outside of the DRC (Sikakulya et al., 2020). The province is a hub for travel and trade, as 
21 
 
well as human trafficking. It also has been an area marked with armed conflict for the past 25 
years (Theunis, 2018). Geographic and travel limitations pose challenges for both patients and 
healthcare workers due to increasing violence and political unrest. The unique geographic 
boundaries and political climate of the area have made it difficult to disseminate information 
to more rural communities, along with providing necessary response mechanisms, such as 
surveillance, contact tracing, and vaccination. 
POE screenings have been employed to mitigate the risk of Ebola patients from exiting 
the country, along with establishing travel and trade health measures. Communication with 
governments of neighboring countries has also been employed to best reduce the risk of cross-







3.0 Looking to the Future 
3.1 Long Term Impacts 
While it is important to focus on response and intervention methods to stop the spread 
of disease in the DRC, further understanding of the long-term effects of the outbreak will be 
necessary for recovery efforts. We can begin to predict and understand long-term impacts of 
the epidemic in the DRC by looking at past ebolavirus epidemics, such as the 2014 West 
African epidemic. Though the DRC has a fraction of the cases compared to that of West 
Africa, healthcare infrastructure and resource acquirement and allocation are noticeably 
similar. During the 2014 West African Ebola epidemic, the countries largely affected by 
disease burden, Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, suffered from large socioeconomic 
consequences. The epidemic had caused major setbacks for treatments and control of endemic 
infectious diseases, such as HIV, tuberculosis, and malaria. Routine health services, such as 
maternity care, childhood vaccinations, and HIV testing, were interrupted, with an estimated 
reduction of 50% of healthcare services (Parpia et al., 2016). Agriculture accounts for 57%, 
39%, and 20% of Guinea’s, Liberia’s, and Sierra Leone’s gross domestic products (GDP) 
respectively, and according to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN, the 
percentage of traders decreased by 20%, leading to total economic losses of approximately 
$2.8 billion (Dakar, 2016). 
As the situation in the DRC continues to decline in cases and geographic spread, we 
are already beginning to see the losses in economic productivity and routine health practices. 
In a study published in September 2019, researchers looked at the economic burden the 
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outbreak had on the economy of the DRC. They found that the monetary value of human lives 
lost (MVYLL) to the ebolavirus outbreak between May 8th, 2018 and May 27th, 2019 was 
$13,801 USD for each of the 1,286 lives lost. This resulted in a total MVYLL of $17,761,539 
USD for the entire country (Kirigia et al., 2019). North Kivu and Ituri have already lost 
significant agricultural production due to violence and conflict in the region; however, the 
Ebola epidemic has further exacerbated this loss. As the outbreak worsened in Ituri and North 
Kivu, resources for routine healthcare in the DRC were depleted and redirected towards Ebola 
response. This has led to disruptions in routine healthcare and childhood vaccination 
schedules. In 2019, the DRC reported one of the largest and most fatal outbreaks of measles 
across the world. It had affected 26 provinces, and as of January 7th, 2020, the DRC  amassed 
a reported 310,000 suspected measles cases resulting in over 6,000 deaths. A majority of these 
cases had occurred in children under the age of five and had been a result of under vaccination 
(Andrada, 2020). A complete illustration of the impact of ebolavirus on the DRC cannot be 
fully understood in the present; however, based on past Ebola outbreaks in countries of similar 
economic and resource statuses, we can expect to see declines in healthcare, food security, and 
overall well-being of its inhabitants. 
3.2 What Needs to be Done? 
Since the start of 2020, the epidemic has slowly declined in spread and reported 
cases, with only five new reported cases in the past 21 days and cases being confined to 
two health areas within North Kivu (Ebola Virus Disease: Democratic Republic of the 
Congo External Situation Report, 2020). Though response partners are cautiously 
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optimistic with the overall trend and reduced geographic spread, the question remains: how 
do we end the outbreak and mitigate the risks of disease resurgence? 
In an article published by NPR in January 2020, several health professionals directly 
involved in response efforts were asked the question: What can we do to end the outbreak? 
Responses to the question involved ideas of increasing levels of safety for healthcare 
workers and bolstering the healthcare infrastructure of the DRC. 
Dr. Marie Roseline, a field coordinator with WHO, who worked in a facility that 
was attacked by an armed group, stated that the government and other partnering 
organizations needed to ensure Ebola responders’ safety when traveling from one hotspot 
to the next. Travel time had to be cut down from treatment and response centers for daily 
surveillance and prevention measures to occur. 
David Gressly, a U.N. emergency Ebola response coordinator, argued that providing 
more armed guards to protect healthcare workers would ensure healthcare worker safety, and 
would allow communities affected by conflict to have the proper prevention and response 
resources. However, Brian Moller, an emergency coordinator for Doctors Without Borders in 
North Kivu, says that more armed guards will likely backfire, especially if they are stationed 
at or near healthcare facilities. Years of abuse at the hands of the Congo’s military has led to 
great mistrust from the local population. Combined with recent attacks from armed rebel 
groups, communities have protested the military and U.N. peacekeepers for failing to protect 
them from violence. 
Others argue that bolstering the DRC’s healthcare system would help end the 
epidemic and provide long term tools to assist in the prevention of future outbreaks. During 
the early phases of the outbreak, the Ebola response was largely a standalone effort, rather 
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than a collaboration with the DRC’s existing network of healthcare centers. When the 
epidemic officially ends, healthcare centers need to be prepared for the likelihood of disease 
resurgence by having appropriate resources and tools allocated to infectious disease response 
(Aizenman, 2020). 
WHO reports that in order to maintain a pattern of reduced spread and continued 
decline of cases, access and security to communities needs to be prioritized. It is critical to 
maintain response capacities to rapidly detect and respond to reintroduction events, and to 
prioritize survivor monitoring and the maintenance of cooperative relationships with the 
survivors’ associations (Ebola Virus Disease: Democratic Republic of the Congo External 
Situation Report, 2020). 
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4.0 Discussion and Conclusions 
Ebolavirus is a highly infectious agent that has severely affected the North Kivu and Ituri 
provinces of the DRC. The epidemic has led to nearly 3,444 cases within this region and caused 
2,130 deaths, resulting in a CFR of 66%. The number of cases and deaths is likely much higher 
due to under reporting in rural and hard to reach communities. Controlling the outbreak and 
deploying resources to areas in need have been proven to be difficult due to poor healthcare 
infrastructure, presence of political conflict and armed militant groups, community mistrust, and 
the unique geographic characteristics of the eastern DRC. These issues have led to challenges 
in dissemination of correct information regarding methods of treatment and control, along with 
identifying and following-up with confirmed and suspected cases. The use of vaccinations and 
community mobilization have shown to be successful in limiting the transmission of cases and 
relaying patients to proper care facilities; however, armed conflict groups and attacks on 
healthcare workers and treatment centers have interfered with response measures. Continued 
surveillance and community support are vital for the continued decline of reported cases and 
geographic spread of the disease. The safety of frontline healthcare workers also needs to be 
prioritized because they play a primary role in controlling the transmission of the disease and 
the treatment of patients. As national and international organizations move forward in the 
aftermath of the epidemic, resources and assistance need to be directed towards bolstering the 
weakened healthcare infrastructure of the DRC. Access to routine health practices, vaccination 
schedules, and regular surveillance will assist in the prevention of a resurgence of Ebola. It is 
likely that cases of Ebola will occur in the future, however a prepared national health system 
will help prevent an epidemic of this severity again. 
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In conclusion, this essay provides a narrative of the present Ebola epidemic in the DRC 
and outlines the contributing factors that have led to difficulties in controlling the spread of 
disease. It is important to study Ebola epidemics, such as that in the DRC, because it can further 
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